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Abstract 
 
Development geography has long sought to understand why inequalities exist and the 
best ways to address them. Dependency theory sets out an historical rationale for under-
development, based on colonialism and a legacy of developed core and under-developed 
periphery. Race is relevant in this theory only in so far that Europeans are white and the 
places they colonised were occupied by people with darker skin colour. There are no 
innate biological reasons why it happened in that order. However, a new theory for 
national inequalities proposed by Lynn and Vanhanen in series of publications makes the 
case that poorer countries have that status because of a poorer genetic stock rather than an 
accident of history. They argue that IQ has a genetic basis and IQ is linked to ability. 
Thus races with a poorer IQ have less ability, and thus national IQ can be positively 
correlated with performance as measured by an indicator like GDP/capita. Their thesis is 
one of despair as little can be done to significantly improve genetic stock other than a 
programme of eugenics. This paper summarises and critiques the Lynn and Vanhanen 
hypothesis and the assumptions upon which it is based, and uses this analysis to show 
how a human desire to simplify in order to manage can be dangerous in development 
geography. While the attention may naturally be focussed on the ‘national IQ’ variables 
as a proxy measure of ‘innate ability’, the assumption of GDP/capita as an indicator of 
‘success’ and ‘achievement’ is far more readily accepted without criticism. The paper 
makes the case that the current vogue for indicators, indices and cause-effect can be 
tyrannical.  
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Introduction 
 
At the turn of the century two researchers – Richard Lynn (of the University of Ulster, 
UK) and Tatu Vanhanen (of the University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland) – employed 
an old hypothesis to explain the differences we see in the relative wealth of nations. They 
originally presented their case in a book entitled ‘IQ and the wealth of nations’ (Lynn and 
Vanhanen, 2002) and have recently restated their case in a book entitled ‘IQ and global 
inequality’ (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006). As the titles of both books suggest their 
hypothesis is that the differences we see today between national states in terms of the 
wealth can be explained by the IQ of their respective populations. They claim that a 
population’s IQ is linked to a sense of innate ability which in turn is translated into 
economic performance. The causal chain is simple: the higher the national IQ then the 
greater the innate ability of the population and the better the economic performance. 
Their thesis is a more basic form of the well-established causal chain that education, as 
expressed in better literacy for example, can contribute to economic productivity and 
competitiveness (OECD, 1995; Lewis, 1997), but they go much deeper. Thus arguments 
geographers often employ to explain differences in wealth, for example as a consequence 
of historical factors (dependency theory) or a forcing of one perspective of ‘development’ 
on the rest of the world (post-development), are wrong. Lynn and Vanhanen argue that 
we see today is an inevitable consequence of the quality of the human stock that inhabit 
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those places, and even the post-Second World War emphasis on modernisation is doomed 
to failure. After all, as national inequality is, they claim, to a large extent genetically 
predetermined then attempts to address inequality can only be achieved by boosting 
national IQs.  
 
The Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis is not a new one. It is the latest chapter of an old 
story founded on an assumption that races differ in terms of their intelligence and this in 
turn is reflected in differences in the degree to which societies are ‘developed’.   Both 
books have been well-received by some: 
 
“This is a book that social scientists, policy experts, and global investment analysts 
cannot afford to ignore. It is one of the most brilliantly clarifying books this reviewer has 
ever read.” 
Rushton (2003). In a review of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) 
 
“In their new book Lynn and Vanhanen have convincingly refuted those critics who 
asserted that their national IQs lack reliability and validity. For economics, they have 
made what is arguably the most important contribution to economic understanding since 
Adam Smith showed that free markets promote economic development. They have also 
shown that national IQs explain much of the variation between nations in a wide range of 
economic and social phenomena. Their book extends the explanatory power of the 
concept of intelligence in a way that makes a major contribution to the integration of 
psychology with the other social sciences.” 
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Rushton (2006). In a review of Lynn and Vanhanen (2006) 
 
While others have been far less charitable: 
 
“This is not so much science, then, as a social crusade…..this is a blast from another 
age, an old-fashioned attempt to give an imperial mindset biological validity” 
Richardson (2004; page 360). In a review of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002). 
 
Biology has been down this road of genetic determinism of human intelligence and 
behaviour many times, including the so-called Social Darwinism of the 19
th
 Century 
(Claeys, 2000) and the more recent rise of socio-biology in the 1980s (Wilson, 2000). 
Social Darwinism is a term often employed in the 20
th
 Century to describe the maelstrom 
of ideas which hypothesised superiority of one race (often white skinned and colonisers) 
over others (often brown skinned and colonised). As the term implies, it illustrates the 
notion of ‘survival of the fittest’ arising from a natural selection founded on competition. 
Indeed Claeys (2000) makes an interesting, and under-explored, link between the origins 
of Social Darwinsim and emerging concepts of political economy arising out of Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) and the logic of “fit nations” able to maintain a 
competitive edge; early echoes of the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis. Socio-biology 
sought to explain animal behaviour in terms of propagation of genes rather than 
individuals. Thus altruism in insects, for example, which may seem counter-intuitive at a 
superficial level (what would the individuals possibly gain?), could be readily explained 
as within such species individuals are genetically identical. Thus altruism could be 
 6 
explained as genes helping other identical genes to survive and multiply. The individual 
might die but her genes were the same as those of the breeding members of the 
population and thus altruism makes biological sense. Genes were postulated to explain 
certain behaviours in animals in much the same way that they can influence physical 
characteristics, and thus these behaviours are open to exactly the same process of natural 
selection. But proponents went further and extended their ideas into the complexities of 
human society and culture, hoping to explain variation in sexuality, criminality, creativity 
and intelligence amongst others. While the basis of the reasoning may be different the 
underlying process of “survival of the fittest” pervades the argument and this caused 
much debate at the time, with one of its originators even being attacked during public 
meetings. Separating nature from nurture in humans has always been contentious. 
 
By way of contrast, the geography literature has been surprisingly silent on the Lynn and 
Vanhanen hypothesis. Are there not lessons for us engaged in development geography 
that can be gleaned from such extreme attempts to simplify in order to understand? The 
paper will explore this question by using the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis as an 
archetype of what can happen with such efforts. The paper will first present the chain of 
reasoning behind the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis and illustrate the serious flaws that 
rest behind it. This is an important issue which deserves to be brought into the light of 
geographical discourse. But also of importance is how the Lynn and Vanhanen 
hypothesis is symptomatic of a much wider and yet far less apparent problem in 
development geography – the potential tyranny of indicators.  
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IQ and race 
 
The history of efforts to identify a genetic basis for IQ is a long and interesting one, and 
has a distinctly British influence. Sir Francis Galton (1822 - 1911), a cousin of Charles 
Darwin, is often regarded as the first person to statistically explore the heritability of 
human intelligence. Galton had a remarkable intellect and the invention of tools routinely 
employed in human geography today (questionnaires, standard deviation, regression and 
correlation) are often attributed to him. He also coined the term eugenics and encouraged 
selective marriages to help enhance the genetic stock of any offspring. Carl (Karl) 
Pearson (1857 – 1936) who helped found the science of mathematical statistics was the 
first holder of the Galton Chair of Eugenics at University College London. He made 
many contributions to statistics, and Person’s Chi-square test is widely used. Although a 
socialist he advocated competitive struggle (war even) between superior and inferior 
races as a means of improving the human stock. Another statistician heavily influenced 
by the work of Galton on the heritability of intelligence, Charles Spearman (1863 – 
1945), helped develop an important technique which is now widely employed in statistics 
– factor analysis. Spearman began with the reasonable assumption that students doing 
well in one exam (geography for example) were also likely to do well in another (such as 
maths). Hence a set of test scores for a group of students in a range of subjects were 
likely to be positively correlated using the statistical technique invented by Galton and 
further developed by Pearson.  The same applies to performance on various types of 
intelligence test. Using these correlation coefficients it is possible to extract principal 
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components; mathematical expressions of an underlying relationship (Spearman, 1904, 
1927). Using factor analysis it can be shown that approximately 40% of the variation in 
intelligence test results can be explained by a vector (usually referred to as general 
intelligence or general cognitive ability; ‘g’). Much of the modern, often quite heated, 
discourse surrounding a genetic basis for IQ is founded on this concept of ‘g’ (Jensen, 
1998).  
 
As ‘g’ emerges as a principal component in factor analysis it should be remembered that 
it is first and foremost a mathematical construct. After all, no matter how good the 
mathematical theory upon which it is based a statistically significant correlation 
coefficient does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Even so, there have been 
attempts to see ‘g’ as a statistical indicator of something physical. Indeed the current 
thinking is that ‘g’ reflects a biological basis (Brody, 1998, 1999), with some even 
pointing to a specific site for ‘g’ within the brain (Duncan et al, 2000). It is correlated 
with a range of biological variables such as frontal grey matter volume of the brain 
(Thompson et al, 2001), although others suggest that the physical basis for ‘g’ may be 
spread around the brain (Colom et al., 2006), and brain size or volume (Wickett et al., 
2000; Posthuma et al., 2002) although this is disputed (Schoenemann et al., 2000). It has 
recently been suggested that ‘g’ is related to ‘working memory capacity’ suggesting that 
the physical basis for the two in the brain may be shared (Colom et al., 2007) even if they 
are not the same thing (Conway et al., 2003). If it has a biological basis then it may be 
genetically determined, if only in part, but empirical evidence for such a chain of 
reasoning has been elusive. If there is a genetic basis for ‘g’ (i.e. it is heritable), and some 
 9 
certainly claim that this is proven (Toga and Thompson, 2005),  then despite the powerful 
techniques currently available it has not yet been possible to identify the genes involved 
(Plomkin, 2001).   
 
A biological and genetic basis for ‘g’ implies that differences in general intelligence may 
exist not only between individuals but between groups which have some genetic 
difference such as those based on sex and race. Many have looked for such differences 
since the 19
th
 century, well before ‘g’ emerged from statistical analysis (Gould, 1996). 
Attempts to show that ‘g’ is higher in males than females continues to this day (Lynn and 
Irwin, 2008), and is claimed to be related to the larger brain sizes of males relative to 
females (Colom and Lynn, 2004). While within race variation in IQ is acknowledged to 
be much greater than variation between races (Spearman, 1927; Brody, 1998) results 
have implied a hierarch: Asians perform best followed by Europeans with those of 
African origin performing the worst (Lynn, 1996; Rushton, 1997; Rushton and Jensen, 
2005). Rushton (2001) has argued that these differences in rank order can be found for 
different races living within the same country. Indeed, given the chain of assumption that 
genes are partly involved in determining ‘g’, and hence there are differences between 
individuals and groups, then this does present a challenge that strikes at the very heart of 
human geography as we know it today. As two of the main players in this field have 
stated: 
 
“A prevailing worldview throughout history has been that economic, cultural, and other 
environmental forces are the pre-eminent causes of group and individual behavior. 
Modern social science has typically taken this perspective and promoted the idea that all 
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babies are born more or less equally endowed in intelligence and learning ability. It 
followed therefore that inequalities were the result of social, economic, and political 
forces. This worldview generated many strategies for intervention in the home, the 
workplace, the mass media, the criminal justice system, and even the entire social–
economic system. Some have been effective and are almost universally accepted, whereas 
others have failed and produced only shattered expectations, resentment, and interethnic 
hostility.” 
Rushton and Jensen (2005; page 284) 
 
 
It is, of course, but a small step from ‘proof’ of cause-effect to suggest policy 
interventions that could enhance ‘g’ within a population. After all, individuals with low 
‘g’ may be relatively unproductive and thus poor and may even have to be supported by 
the state. There are indeed historical examples of immigration and educational policy 
based on assumptions of a difference in general intelligence between races (Gould, 1996; 
Schönemann, 1997), and there are others who have advocated a modification of social 
welfare systems to discourage births amongst poor women who are assumed to be low in 
‘g’ (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). Even if ‘g’ does exist as a physical and heritable 
entity some have questioned the dangers of over-simplification which can arise given that 
so many other factors are important (Bowman et al., 2001). However, predictably this 
simple causal chain of reasoning: 
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 genes  brain size/function   assessed as ‘g’  ability  socio-economic 
performance  policies to enhance ‘g’ in a population 
 
allied with an assumption that races differ in ‘g’ and resulting policy implications, such as 
curbing immigration, have been popular calls amongst extreme right-wing groups. It is 
within this maelstrom that the Lynn and Vanhanen thesis has emerged to explain reasons 
for the inequalities that rest at the heart of development geography, and their message has 
not been lost on some groups.  
 
There have been numerous efforts to counter the simple causal chain, and a paper such as 
this cannot hope to cover all of the ground covered in this substantial, vigorous and often 
heated debate. The interested reader is referred to Modgil and Modgil (1987), Sternberg 
(1987), Commentary (1995), Gould (1996), Brand (1996), Schönemann (1987, 1997) and 
Miele (2003) for a taste. For example, Dr Chris Brand’s 1996 book, ‘The g Factor’, 
which made a case for racial difference in intelligence was de-published by Wiley 
although it did appear on the internet and can be downloaded from his website. Brand 
was dismissed from his post at the University of Edinburgh in 1997. The recent 
suspension of Dr Frank Ellis, from the University of Leeds for supporting the notion that 
the ‘white’ race was more intelligent than the ‘black’ race is another example that made 
headlines in the UK. Looking for racial differences in IQ by employing intelligence tests 
raises the question as to whether the results simply reflect the fact that most of the IQ 
tests have been designed by ‘white’ races (Gould, 1996; Rutter, 2003). But ‘race’ is a 
constructed term, both socially and culturally (White, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Kothari, 
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2006), so what does ‘Asian’ and ‘European’ or indeed ‘black’ and ‘white’ mean? It must 
first be said that ‘race’ is a concept which does have relevance in development (White, 
2002; Kothari, 2006) given the history of colonialism which has influenced relationships 
between much of the poor and rich parts of the globe. As a result Kothari (2006: 6) 
argues that “Race is fundamental in not only explaining how the modern world system 
emerged but also how it functions in localized and globalized relationships”. In 
biological terms ‘race’ is also contested given that intra-racial genetic variation is often 
greater than inter-racial variation (85% vs 15% respectively according to Lewontin, 
1972), although some do argue that ‘race’ in humans has a genetic relevance (Edwards, 
2003). Also, to what extent is IQ malleable and influenced by environment to produce 
what one measures as ‘intelligence’ with tests (Brody, 1998, 1999; Garlick, 2002)? 
Indeed, ‘intelligence’ is not fixed throughout an individual’s lifetime and the influence of 
the ‘environment’, especially education, is still unclear (Jensen, 1980; Brody, 1998, 1999; 
Myerson et al., 1998). Garlick (2002) has argued that schooling can influence 
performance on IQ tests and this may explain the so-called Flynn effect where 
performance on such tests has been shown to improve with time (Flynn, 1987). The 
degree to which learning influences performance on IQ tests has also been the subject of 
much discussion (e.g. Jensen, 1980) with some pointing out that schooling can increase 
IQ performance (Garlick, 2002) and this may partly cause the gradual increase in 
intelligence as measured by IQ tests that one has seen for all races over time (Flynn, 
1987). Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that a recent editorial summary of all the 
evidence suggests that the case for a heritability (hence genetic) factor to ‘g’ when 
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compared with these other influences is still far from being proven (Ceci and Williams, 
2007).  
 
 
 The IQ and economic development hypothesis: The case for 
 
In their original book Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) base their argument on a regression 
between national IQ (determined as an average of tests applied to samples of individuals) 
as the independent variable against a suit of economic indicators such as GDP/capita as 
the dependent variable for groups of 81 (Chapter 7) and 185 (Chapter 8) countries. Their 
2001 paper summarises the results from Chapter 7 of the book for the 81 countries. While 
GDP/capita and its ilk may be problematic as a measure of ‘development’ and is not 
without its problems as a measure of economic activity it does have a solid foundation in 
theory. In their latest analysis (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) present a new dataset of 
measured IQs for 113 countries and estimates for a further 79 countries, and regress them 
against a broad suit of economic and development indicators that are well-known in 
development geography including the Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Related 
Development Index (GDI), economic growth rate, Gini Index (measures inequality of 
income or resources), Headcount Ratio (proportion of population below the $2/day 
poverty line) and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Such 
indices are fashionable, representing as they do attempts to compress the complexity of 
reality into single numbers as a guide to policy and management (Morse, 2004). 
However, for the purposes of this paper the focus will be upon the case they made in their 
 14 
2002 publication as that is more clearly focussed on economic indicators as a measure of 
‘output’. Indeed some of the indices they employ in their 2006 book such as the HDI and 
GDI have GDP/capita as a component.  
 
The reader can find all of the Lynn and Vanhanen methodological details in their 2002 
book (and summarised in their 2001 paper) and need not be repeated here, although it is 
necessary to highlight some of the assumptions. The national IQ data are based on 
published test results spanning a period of 70 years, and adjusted relative to a value for 
Britain of ‘100’ and a standard deviation of 15. The data have also been adjusted for ‘IQ 
inflation’ (The Flynn Effect) of 2.5 points a decade since the 1930s. One of the problems 
with this approach rests with the extrapolation of relatively small samples (referred to by 
Richardson, 2004, as “motley tests”) to ‘national IQ’. Just how representative are the 
results of such tests, often of individuals within a narrow age range? This is a criticism 
that Lynn and Vanhanen are well aware of and they have tried to deal with it by 
triangulating the IQ results against other parameters which they see as related to IQ. For 
example, Lynn and Vanhanen argue in their first book that their national IQ data correlate 
well with national scores in mathematics (r = 0.9 N = 30 P<0.001) and science (r = 0.878 
N = 30 P<0.001) that are available, and recent work has attempted to reinforce and refine 
the link (Lynn and Mikk, 2007). Not all countries have samples of IQ tests that can be 
drawn upon to derive a national value, and Lynn and Vanhanen close some of these gaps 
by extrapolating from the results for neighbouring countries. Thus the national IQ for 
Afghanistan (83) was found by averaging the values for India (81) and Iran (84) and 
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rounding up. This is, of course, a process of self-reinforcement; apparently ‘new’ data 
created for an Asian country by using the results from other Asian countries.  
 
Lynn and Vanhanen proceed from here to regress national IQ against GDP/capita and the 
results based on a sample of 139 countries out of their 185 are shown as Figure 1. The 
rationale for selecting 139 will be discussed later. There are some differences between 
Figure 1 and the graphs employed by Lynn and Vanhanen (2001, 2002). While the IQ 
data are the same the dependent variable is GDP/capita for 2004 (taken from the UNDP 
Human Development Report for 2006) rather than that of 1998. Also, in order to help 
make the case as strong as possible the logarithm (base e) values of GDP/capita have 
been employed in Figure 1, while in their own publications they have employed the raw 
GDP/capita data. The R
2
 in Figure 1 is 58% while the equivalent R
2
 in the Lynn and 
Vanhanen (2002) book (page 142) based on data for 185 countries is 39%. 
 
Given the statistical significance of the relationship in Figure 1 the authors would 
conclude an unambiguous cause-effect with national IQ said to be a main factor (not the 
only one) in the determination of economic development as measured by GDP/capita. 
They theorise that IQ measures an innate ability and the higher the IQ then the higher the 
ability and this becomes reflected in better national performance as measured by 
GDP/capita. Once a causal chain between IQ and economic performance is assumed to be 
‘proven’ it is but a short step to consider the repercussions for policy. On page 195 of 
their 2002 book we have: 
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“Because of the evidence we have assembled for a causal relationship between national 
IQs and economic disparities, it has to be accepted that there will inevitably be a 
continuation of economic inequalities between nations. Intelligence differences between 
nations will be impossible to eradicate because they have a genetic basis and have 
evolved over the course of tens of thousands of years.”  
 
Seems like all we can do is despair and hope that ‘outlier’ countries that have yet to reach 
their economic potential as predicated by IQ can be helped to do so.  
 
The Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis has been adapted by others. Templer and Arikawa 
(2006) for example include climate, notably temperature, in their analysis of the Lynn 
and Vanhanen national IQ dataset. They conclude that mean temperature is negatively 
correlated with national IQ. Kanazawa (2006) and McDaniel (2006) attempt a Lynn and 
Vanhanen type of exercise for states of the US, arguing that the same logic should hold at 
more micro scales. While there are no uniform state level tests of IQ they do find weak 
positive correlations between performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), ACT 
and a composite of the two (SAT and ACT are college entrance exams) and state wealth. 
However, given the patchiness of the use of ACT and SAT across the States and the 
difficulty of arriving at a common denominator for IQ the work was inconclusive. 
 
While the Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) case looks at national differences there is an overt 
linkage to race. But what do the IQ test results of Lynn and Vanhanen say about ‘racial’ 
difference? Employing dummy variables for ‘Europe’, ‘North America and Australia’, 
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‘Asia’ and ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’ for a sample of 152 countries in the Lynn 
and Vanhanen (2002) dataset it is possible to arrive at the regression analysis shown in 
Table 1 with national IQ (Africa is the baseline). The regression is highly significant with 
an R
2
 of approximately 75%. All four slopes are positive with respect to Africa, with 
Europe and the ‘North America and Australia’ categories having the greatest value 
suggesting that its here that the highest IQs are to be found. Latin America and the 
Caribbean as well as Asia do relatively poorly. The mix of results shown here is generally 
explained by Lynn and Vanhanen as being a function of racial differences (e.g. whites 
have a higher IQ than blacks), with some of the error caused by immigration. Hence some 
countries such as the US have their IQ depressed “because of the substantial numbers in 
the population of blacks and Hispanics” (page 62). Note that they employ these regions 
as crude proxies for ‘race’.  
 
 
The IQ and economic development hypothesis: The case against 
 
The central dilemma of the Lynn and Vanhanen case rests with their assumption that 
national IQ data are primarily (not wholly) a function of innate ability which in turn is at 
least partly generated by genes.  There are many assumptions of cause – effect in here, 
and some of them involve substantial leaps of faith. The first, that there are genetic 
differences between human races, is perhaps the least contentious but even here the terms 
can be loose and there are disputes given the levels of intra-racial genetic variation. On a 
more substantive note there are problems with labels. For example, it is possible to look 
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at differences in IQ between countries having English, French, Spanish and Arabic as 
their official language. This will cut across the regional divisions and presumably also the 
racial divisions employed by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002). The results for the same 
countries included in Table 1 are shown as Table 2 (regression with dummies used for 
language). The comparison here is against countries not having one of those four 
languages as its official language. The findings suggest that those countries having 
French, Arabic or English as their ‘official’ languages have significantly lower IQs than 
those that don’t! Remember that this is exactly the same data set as used for Table 1, but 
the countries have been classified in a different way. Admittedly the R
2
 is lower but the 
model is still statistically significant.    
 
Secondly, as has already been discussed, the extent to which ‘g’ is physical and 
genetically determined (heritable) is open to much contention. The problem can be 
illustrated by looking at a simple measure which we do know to be strongly inherited – 
height. But even here it is widely acknowledged that environmental factors such as 
nutrition can have a major influence. If height is highly heritable and yet also open to 
environmental influence then what of ‘g’? The case is not proven and if better schooling 
gives higher IQs, and more wealth brings better education systems, then the neat cause-
effect assumption of Lynn and Vanhanen breaks down.   
 
Thirdly, GDP is a measure of monetary flow in an economy, and is not without its 
problems even when adjusted for purchasing power parity. For example, it does not 
include ‘unregistered’ flows of money such as through the black market or systems where 
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no records are kept, and the latter can be of especial importance in markets of developing 
countries. However, in addition to these points it should be noted that economic 
performance as measured with the suite of indicators employed by Lynn and Vanhanen 
(2002) can be driven by many factors, including the endowment of valuable natural 
resources, politics, proximity to well-performing economies etc. This could, of course, be 
claimed to contribute to error variation in the Lynn and Vanhanen model so that at some 
similar levels of national IQ there is a wide variation in GDP/capita.  For example there 
are 11 countries having a national IQ of 72. They are mostly African countries 
(Botswana, Chad, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland and Tanzania), but they span loge GDP/capita values from 6.51 (~ 
$672/capita) to 9.32 (~ $11,159/capita). Indeed, an illustration of the dangers of a cause-
effect assumption with IQ and GDP/capita can be demonstrated by taking another 
theoretical ‘effect’ besides GDP/capita at the national level of IQ. Rather than select any 
of the development indices/indicators in the Lynn and Vanmhanen (2006) publication I 
have selected the number of journal publications published by authors having a postal 
address in the country adjusted for the population of that country (number of articles per 
million population). There are three main reasons for selecting this variable as a measure 
of ‘success’: 
 
1. the readership of this paper will largely comprise academics and this community 
is only too aware of the importance of journal articles as a measure of their 
individual and departmental ‘success’. It is thus an indicator that has an especial 
resonance with that group. 
 20 
2. journal paper ‘success’ does form the basis for national and institutional policy 
judgments in a number of countries such as the UK with its Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) and even more so with its proposed successor, the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) . Hence this is certainly not a novel or untried 
variable with which to measure ‘success’. An example is provided in the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee report of 2004-05 (page 11) where 
the drop in the UK’s share of global publications is bemoaned and blamed in part 
on developing countries increasing their output.  
3. Data on the number of published articles per country can easily be gleaned from 
the Web of Science service (Thomson Scientific; scientific.thomson.com). 
 
The methodology employed is admittedly crude in that it allocates an article to each of 
the countries represented in a multi-authored paper. If say four authors are from the UK 
then that paper appears as a single count under ‘UK’, but if one each is from the UK, 
USA, France and Germany then all four countries received a ‘count’. Thus the data may 
bias in favour of multi-authored multi-country articles. Also there is no weighting for the 
numbers of citations generated by a paper. A paper with no citations in the literature 
would be counted the same as one having hundreds. Recent proposals to employ 
publications as a measure of research ‘quality’, such as REF in the UK, are citation based 
rather than simply counting the number of papers. However, even with these limitations 
the results are illuminating. A plot of the number of journal articles published in 2004 per 
million head of national population against the national IQ data of Lynn and Vanhanen 
(2002) for the same 139 countries employed in Figure 1 is presented as Figure 2. 
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Countries with no papers published in 2004 and the USA with a very high count have 
been omitted from the sample. It should be noted that while the distribution of the data 
points suggests heteroscedasticity this has been ignored. The regression is statistically 
significant (log number of articles per million people has been employed) with an R
2
 of 
50% which is admittedly lower than in Figure 1 but is still reasonable and compares well 
with many of the R
2
 in  Lynn and Vanhanen (2002). The relationship would seem to have 
a similar superficial logic to the GDP/capita and IQ argument. After all, a higher IQ 
(innate ability) for a population would presumably result in a better quality of personnel 
at university and research institutes and hence an enhanced ability to compete for 
publication space in journals.  
 
As with the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis founded on GDP/capita there are many 
problems with the assumption that number of publications is a valid measure of output. 
After all, the higher education workforce is very mobile and a university may have a 
significant proportion of its academic staff from all over the world even if the majority 
are from the country in which the institution is based. There are also policy interventions 
to consider. The RAE employed in the UK till 2008 as a form of accountability 
encourages academics to publish even if they only have to submit four articles for 
scrutiny every 5 or 6 years. One would expect given this inducement that the UK would 
have a relatively higher publication rate for its national IQ, and a cursory glance at the 
data suggests that this is indeed so. Of the five countries having national IQ values of 100 
the UK has 1,219 articles per million of population compared to 1,200 for Singapore, 
1,117 for New Zealand, 1,093 for Belgium and 41 for China. The ‘article’ indicator is 
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also a function of GDP/capita as shown in Figure 3. A significant relationship between 
these two may well have been expected given that both are statistically related to national 
IQ, but here the adjusted R
2
 is the best of all three at 76%. Again, the relationship is 
logical as greater national wealth leads to more expenditure on universities etc. in the 
form of better salaries to attract the best researchers and good facilities. Indeed given the 
‘messiness’ of both GDP/capita and my ‘articles’ indicator it is frankly surprising that the 
R
2
 is as good as it is. It would suggest that the article indicator is dominated at global 
scales by national wealth, and policy tools such as the RAE may appear to be of only 
secondary importance. Table 3 is a list of the top 20 countries in terms of GDP/capita 
along with their observed values of the article indicator, their predicted values and 
residuals (observed – predicted) derived from the equation in Figure 3. While the RAE as 
a policy instrument may be reasonably argued to give the UK a positive and healthy 
residual of +0.7668 relative to competitors such as Germany and France this residual is in 
fact less than that of  a number of countries not having an RAE-style policy in place. Still 
without picking apart the data too much the point remains that if national wealth is seen 
as a driver of the articles indicator rather than the other way around, then it seems 
reasonable to think of the IQ variable as also being driven by wealth via education rather 
than the reverse.   
 
Discussion 
 
The Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis, for all of its flaws, has had remarkably little 
exposure in the development geography literature, and this is dangerous. The ideas of 
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Lynn and Vanhanen are presented as science, and like all scientific endeavour the 
hypotheses stand or fall by the evidence and should be challenged in those terms. IQ tests 
and indeed GDP are constructs of human beings; ‘intelligence’ can be defined by IQ (and 
‘g’) just as ‘progress’ can be defined by GDP or indeed HDI. In this paper I have also 
employed the number of published articles per head of population as a measure of 
‘success’ in knowledge production and that too is positively correlated with IQ and 
indeed with GDP/capita. But it is the old argument in correlation of what is influencing 
what? It seems logical to imagine publication output being simply a function of 
GDP/capita and hence investment in researchers and infrastructure although wealth can 
also be driven by investment in research.  Similarly an assumption that innate ability as 
measured by IQ is the driving force behind wealth would appear to ignore the possibility 
that IQ could also be a function of wealth via investment in education. Intelligence tests 
have existed for a long time and analyses of the extensive data do consistently suggest 
that a ‘g’ exists. There is also growing evidence to suggest that it may have a physical 
basis within the brain, even if it can’t be pinned down to a specific location. But there is 
clearly much complexity to all this considering the ‘environmental’ influence on ‘g’ and 
the dangers of over-simplification when comparing groups is immense (Gould 1996; 
Flynn, 2003).   
 
So why as development geographers should we bother with such things? Explaining 
inequality at all spatial scales is our most central goal, and it may be argued that while the 
Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis may be an extreme example of searching for a simple 
way of explaining social inequality (blame it on the genes) it is nonetheless symptomatic 
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of a wider trend that we have seen in development geography; the continuous attraction 
of simple explanations for complexity or, put another way, the quick fix. The dilemma is 
that we focus almost entirely on one of the scales of the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis – 
IQ and its presumed link to race – as being the most contentious, even offensive, and this 
is understandable. We can pour through the arguments for this as I have done here, and 
most would find the evidence inconclusive at best. Hence the IQ-race relationship is 
readily rejected. Scientific racism as a theory for explaining difference is far from being 
dead and deserves to be challenged, not least by geographers.  
 
But there is much more to Figure 1 than a debunking of the attempt to relate national IQ, 
race and performance. This may be the dimension that catches the eye, but we all too 
often forget that the other axis in the graph with its assumption that GDP/capita  is a 
measure of progress or achievement is also deeply contentious but on this occasion is 
hidden by the fashion for the use for such measures. We live in a world of indicators and 
indices which try to compress complex information into single numbers or maybe a group 
of few dozen (Morse, 2006). This is done to help measure the influence of policy or, put 
simply of all, to help ‘mangers to manage’, but the richness of human existence and well-
being becomes compressed into a few numbers. The past 30 years have seen a huge 
growth in the creation and promotion of indicators and indices, and Lynn and Vanhanen 
adopt some of them as dependent variables in their 2006 book. A survey undertaken by 
the UNDP cataloguing indices intended to measure country performance and behaviour 
suggest that in the 1970s there were less than 10 such indices whereas by 2005 there were 
more than 120, with some 80% of the total appearing in the period 1991 to 2005  
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(Bandura, 2005). This is something of a boom industry and once indices have been 
created it is tempting to work in the Lynn and Vanhanen style of regressing them against 
other explanatory variables, but it is also easy to lose sight of the simplifying and value-
led assumptions which rest behind the creation of the HDI, GDI, CPI etc. (Morse, 2004). 
The danger is that the indices/indicators become the vision rather than being seen as 
limited transects into richness. This is also not to say that GDP/capita is any better or 
worse compared to any index which could be created.  These are value judgements, not 
science, and any indicator or index will, by definition, be a mere shadow of reality.  
 
We constantly need to make sense of the world and ‘consilience’, a term coined by the 
biologist Edward O. Wilson, rests on a “conviction, far deeper than a mere working 
proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural 
laws”. In effect, he argues: 
 
“We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. The world henceforth will 
be run by synthesizers, people able to put together the right information at the right time, 
think critically about it, and make important choices wisely”. 
Wilson (1998: page v) 
 
Wilson’s goal is to apply consilience as almost another form of reductionism to make 
sense of the world. A desire for consilience explains the demand for indicators/indices 
and the drive for cause-effect explanations based on simple regressions; hence the 
extrapolation from these cause-effect ‘facts’ to policy. Ironically for the story presented 
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here Wilson was the originator of sociobiology with its goal of explaining animal 
behaviour patterns with genes (Wilson, 2000). His extension of this theory to human 
behaviour is arguably a form of structuralism where genetic deterministic forces act on 
the behaviour of the individual (Rindos, 1986).    
 
The world today is one where the demand for consilience, primarily perhaps amongst 
those wanting to manage, pushes against the complexity which constantly emerges from 
‘postist’ schools of thought in human geography (post-modern, post-structural) which 
stress the importance of multifaceted interpretation of self and society. To me the danger 
of the Lynn and Vanhanen hypothesis is two-fold. Poor science all too easily highlighted 
by the assumptions made of IQ and its supposed link to race is the most obvious and 
easily decried element of the exercise; it’s the one that holds the attention and calls out to 
be challenged. But their model also illustrates an assumption that is all too pernicious and 
hidden – the potential tyranny of indicators and indices in development geography. 
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Table 1. Link between the results of IQ tests and global regions 
  
Dependent variable is the national IQ test data of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) 
Independent variables are dummy values for region (Africa given a value of zero). 
 
 N Coefficient (SE) T-value 
Intercept  70.96 (0.86) 82.2 *** 
Europe 36 25.93 (1.3) 20.0 *** 
North America and Australia 4 27.3 (3.02) 9.03 *** 
Asia 43 17.0 (1.24) 13.8 *** 
Latin America and the Caribbean 24 13.71 (1.46) 9.4 *** 
 
R
2
 (adjusted = 74.6% 
F = 112.11 *** (df = 4, 147) 
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Table 2. Link between the results of IQ tests and official language of countries. 
 
Dependent variable is the national IQ test data of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) 
Independent variables are dummy values for official language (‘others’ have been given a 
value of zero). 
 
 N Coefficient (SE) T-value 
Intercept  91.02 (1.25) 73.1 *** 
French 27 -12.17 (2.16) -5.63 *** 
Spanish 16 -4.2 (2.76) -1.52 ns 
Arabic 23 -6.19 (2.38) -2.6 ** 
English 39 -10.5 (2.0) -5.28 *** 
 
R
2
 (adjusted) = 26% 
F = 13.89*** (df = 4, 147) 
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Table 3. Observed LN GDP/capita and LN number of published articles/million population for a sample of richer countries. 
 
Also shown are the predicted LN number of articles/million population based on GDP/capita and the residuals.   
 
 
Country LN GDP/capita (2004) 
LN Number of 
articles/million (2004) 
Predicted LN Number of 
articles/million (2004) Residual 
Switzerland 10.41 7.61 6.45 1.16 
Sweden 10.29 7.42 6.27 1.15 
Finland 10.31 7.30 6.29 1.00 
Denmark 10.37 7.30 6.39 0.91 
Singapore 10.24 7.09 6.19 0.90 
Iceland 10.41 7.27 6.45 0.82 
UK 10.34 7.11 6.34 0.77 
Netherlands 10.37 7.13 6.39 0.75 
Australia 10.32 7.05 6.31 0.74 
Canada 10.35 7.03 6.36 0.67 
Belgium 10.34 7.00 6.35 0.64 
Germany 10.25 6.69 6.20 0.48 
Austria 10.38 6.88 6.41 0.47 
France 10.29 6.67 6.26 0.41 
Norway 10.56 7.09 6.69 0.40 
Spain 10.13 6.39 6.01 0.38 
Italy 10.25 6.43 6.20 0.23 
Japan 10.28 6.33 6.26 0.07 
Ireland 10.57 6.67 6.70 -0.03 
Luxembourg 10.60 5.82 6.75 -0.93 
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Figure 1. Economic performance as a function of national IQ 
 
Based on the Lynn and Vanhanen dataset, but employing logarithm (base e) of 
GDP/capita as the dependent variable. GDP/capita taken from the Human Development 
report for 2006. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 Coefficient (SE) T-value 
Intercept 2.03 (0.4896) 4.14 *** 
National IQ 0.078 (0.0057) 13.74 *** 
 
R
2
 (adjusted) = 57.6% 
F = 188.75 *** df = 1, 137 
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Figure 2. Number of journal articles published by authors within a country (per million 
people) as a function of national IQ 
 
National IQ taken from the Lynn and Vanhanen dataset. 
Number of articles per million population taken from Web of Science. 
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 Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -7.56 (0.97) -7.82 *** 
National IQ 0.1328 (0.011) 11.8 *** 
 
R
2
 (adjusted) = 50.0% 
F = 139.3 *** df = 1, 137 
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Figure 3. Number of journal articles published by authors within a country (per million 
people) as a function of GDP/capita 
 
Number of articles per million population taken from Web of Science. 
GDP/capita (2004) taken from the Human Development report for 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -10 (0.672) -14.88 *** 
IQ 1.581 (0.077) 20.63 *** 
 
R
2
 (adjusted) = 76% 
F = 425.56 *** df = 1, 137 
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